“Like travellers navigating an unknown terrain”: Seyla Benhabib on rights and the borders of belonging by Todd, Sharon
UTBILDNING & DEMOKRATI 2006, VOL 15, NR 1, 109–118
TEMA: PEDAGOGISK FILOSOFI, ETIK OCH POLITIK
Across many disciplines, including
education, a certain love–hate relation
has developed with globalization,
swinging between hopeful exuberance
and tragic lamentation, with many
perspectives precariously balanced
between the two. The particular con-
tours of this relation have, of course,
taken shape quite differently accord-
ing to the specific issues arising out of
the various disciplines, and have cov-
ered myriad issues such as the delete-
rious effects of global capital, the
threats facing the natural environment,
the opportunities afforded by informa-
tion technology, the breaking up of the
nation-state, and the hybridization of
culture and identity, to name but a few.
Not merely an academic matter, how-
ever, this focus on globalization has
flourished in the context of current
social movements and political poli-
cies that attempt to grapple with the
broad range of conditions that mark
civil life within and across borders.
Within political theory, there is a
growing concern with how to define
formations of political community in
light of the challenges brought on by
increasingly multicultural, multieth-
nic, and multinational societies. With
such cultural pluralism, nation-states
in particular can no longer easily hold
on to a unified identity based around
a common ethnicity. Moreover, anal-
yses of the current transformation of
nation-states have also occurred in
light of globalizing influences, such as
the development of regional forms of
governance (e.g., the European Union),
the international human rights regime
(e.g., various UN treaties and the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights), and
trans-national institutions (e.g., the
WTO and IMF). Thus the complexity
of articulating a cohesive set of ques-
tions that brings to the fore both the
changing internal characteristics of
states and the growing external pres-
sures of globalization they face is
daunting. The conditions and effects
of globalization are elusive and their
geography is by no means clear. As
Seyla Benhabib (2004) notes, in try-
ing to chart the as-yet-emerging polit-
ical forms of globalization with old
maps “we are like travellers navigat-
ing an unknown terrain” (p. 6).
Our conventional ways of under-
standing nation, citizenship, and com-
munity currently seem inadequate to
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of civil belonging: how does one pre-
vent the growing feeling of disenfran-
chisement among those who do not fit
the “homogeneous” image of the na-
tion, the violent manifestations of
which we witnessed most recently
across France? Responses to such di-
lemmas of citizenship within the
changing features of the nation-state
system have relied particularly on two
old ideas. First, has been the problem-
atic return to the traditional image of
homogeneity – whether conceived of
as a “people,” or an ethnic national
identity – as a way of buttressing the
commonality that has united the po-
litical community in the past and that
has facilitated, to a large degree, the
nation’s capacity to determine itself.
Even though this myth might have
been constitutive of a sense of national
belonging, it no longer offers the sta-
bility it perhaps once did; social forces
larger than national narratives of unity
simply make this claim impossible to
justify in a world where the question
of membership within states is on the
table precisely because these imaginar-
ies no longer hold. A second response,
one less troublesome in my view, but
still not wholly without its problems,
has been the turn to cosmopolitanism,
which encapsulates the push for more
expansive notions of belonging in a
world where borders are becoming
increasingly blurred – both because of
the vast increase in migration and also
because states are far less independ-
ent entities than they were, through free
trade, political federations, interna-
tional law, and human rights treaties.
Also an old idea, current uses of cosmo-
politanism nevertheless stake out a very
different imaginary: citizenship based
on an attachment and belonging to a
the task of explaining the conditions of
contemporary civil, social and eco-
nomic life – they are old maps indeed.
Why is this so? It is certainly not be-
cause cultural and ethnic diversity is a
new element in the body politic, nor
are great periods of migration entirely
novel; and neither has trans-national
politics emerged only in the past quar-
ter century. Rather the newness of the
problem emerges, it seems to me, as
the old fictions of homogeneity upon
which nations have been built have
begun to unravel at the seams. That is,
part of the West’s “social imaginary of
modernity” no longer appears to offer
stability to states. According to Charles
Taylor (2004) social imaginaries are
not simply ideologies that falsely im-
agine reality, but “they also have a
constitutive function, that of making
possible the practices that they make
sense of and thus enable” (p. 183). In
other words, they are inevitable fictions
that all societies cannot live without.
Currently, however, those social and
political practices once sustained by
the imaginary of homogeneity have
actually altered quite considerably. For
example, migration has had a tremen-
dous impact on how nation-states who
previously saw themselves as cultural-
ly uniform (in spite of evidence to the
contrary) are actually challenging that
imaginary through growing participa-
tion in the public sphere. What politi-
cal philosophers are at pains to map is
the nascent formation of these new prac-
tices through a different imaginary lens.
Such lenses, however, are not so
easy to construct, and often old ideas
are mobilized and refashioned in the
service of opening up new possibili-
ties. One of the major challenges for
political theory has to do with issues
111
RECENSIONSESSÄ: “LIKE TRAVELLERS NAVIGATING AN UNKNOWN TERRAIN”: SEYLA BENHABIB ...
pluralist world. Yet, the issue for cos-
mopolitanism, as we shall see, is how
to reconcile its attachments to global
“universals,” such as human rights, with
its commitment to respect and value the
“particulars” represented through diverse
cultures and individuals.1
It is precisely this terrain navi-
gated by Seyla Benhabib (2004) in The
Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and
Citizens. Here is an attempt to offer a
new political imaginary that, in my
reading, takes issue with homogeneity,
on the one hand, and grapples with
the dual attachments of a cosmopoli-
tan outlook, on the other. Originally
delivered as part of the Seeley Lecture
Series at the University of Cambridge,
The Rights of Others represents an
extension of some of her thinking in
her earlier work, The Claims of Cul-
ture (2002). There Benhabib took on
the challenges faced by liberal democ-
racies in light of cultural conflict and
what this means for cultural rights,
gender, and citizenship. Not content
with viewing cultures as homogene-
ous wholes, Benhabib moved beyond
the rather stagnant debates between
multiculturalists and certain demo-
cratic theorists. She resisted falling
into a trite dichotomy that positions
any concern with culture as hopelessly
relativistic, on the one hand, and that
views all universalism as being either
entirely ethnocentric or absolutist, on
the other. Instead, through her under-
standing of deliberative democracy as
a dialogic engagement – an aspect of
her work that I critically discuss be-
low in relation to her more recent text
– she focused on the democratic chal-
lenge to mediate between different
forms of cultural meaning. In terms of
her capacity to navigate boldly
through debates which have become
so polarized, she displays the same
tenaciousness in her newest book. In-
deed, her final chapters on citizenship
and the post-national European scene
in The Claims of Culture are really
the departure points for The Rights of
Others, so readers familiar with the
former will recognize the similarity of
themes and argumentative strategies
in the latter.
In this most recent text, Benhabib
(2004) addresses herself to the condi-
tions of political community: how peo-
ple come to belong and achieve polit-
ical membership in the context of the
current upheavals of the nation-state
system and the vast migration and re-
settlement that is one of the hallmarks
of the global era. As the title suggests,
she is concerned with the rights of those
who have been “othered” through the
boundaries that states create, bounda-
ries which draw distinctions between
those who fully belong and those
whose belonging is much more tenu-
ous. Conferring citizenship (or not) sig-
nifies who is “us” and who is “other”
within set territorial borders. Moreo-
ver it inscribes who has access to so-
cial and civil benefits and who is pro-
tected under which rights. Benhabib
observes that at certain historical junc-
tures the difficulties of political bound-
aries become more visible than at oth-
ers – and this is one such time (Ben-
habib 2004, p. 18). Insightfully, Ben-
1. I have elsewhere described the tensions
within cosmopolitanism in terms of
ambiguity, tracing it from Kant’s fa-
mous formulation of cosmopolitanism
in his essay “Perpetual peace.” See Todd
(forthcoming).
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In situating her response, she locates
the boundaries of political membership
within a dual context: First is that of
the state’s right to determine who and
under what conditions citizenship can
be held, as well as defining which po-
litical and civil rights that those who
are not full citizens are entitled to.
Those seeking asylum, for instance,
rarely have any access to political
forms of participation and their rights
are severely curtailed, whereas some
immigrants who are granted perma-
nent residence might enjoy limited
benefits.2 Thus within liberal democ-
racies, the lines of membership remain
to a large degree nationally deter-
mined. However, this is complicated
somewhat by the second context: the
trans-national one. This is, in effect, a
deterritorialized context, one with no
geographic borders yet one that im-
plicates nations in the regime of inter-
national human rights through vari-
ous declarations, treaties, covenants,
and laws that afford protection to in-
dividuals against state power. Thus the
issue for liberal democracies, in Ben-
habib’s view, is how they can deal with
the conflict between exercising their
sovereignty in defining the terms un-
der which persons will be considered
as members, on the one hand, and
upholding the idea that all human be-
ings should enjoy the same right to be
members of a democratic polity, on
the other. She suggests that we see the
complex negotiation between “con-
habib does not begin with seeing mi-
gration and the fraying of the powers
of the nation-state merely as “prob-
lems,” rather she poses them as op-
portunities for rethinking issues of cit-
izenship and global justice.
Migration, for Benhabib, is a key
element for understanding political
membership; for the difficulties faced
by migrants put into sharp relief the
conditions and meanings of citizenship
in general. With the ever-expanding
numbers of refugees, asylum seekers,
and immigrants in countries around the
globe (not only in the West), the time
seems especially ripe to investigate the
ways in which states determine mem-
bership, how people in foreign lands
come to belong, and, most importantly,
the conditions under which just prac-
tices of membership might develop.
Thus her book is responding to what I
see are urgent questions that states need
to consider in developing policies that
take seriously the pluralistic contexts
they govern. And, of course, if one is
talking about a state as a democracy,
then the people who are governed ought
ideally to be the same as those doing
the governing. In this sense the ques-
tion of who can participate and under
what conditions gets at the heart of the
democratic project.
Benhabib frames the tasks of her
book in terms of two questions:
What should be guiding norma-
tive principles of membership in
a world of increasingly deterrito-
rialized politics? Which practices
and principles of civil and politi-
cal incorporation are most com-
patible with the philosophical
self-understanding and constitu-
tional commitments of liberal de-
mocracies? (p. 12)
2. Benhabib (2004) has assembled com-
parative information on rights and
benefits available to residents with va-
rying status within EU countries. See
pp. 157–161.
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text-transcending” rights claims and
democratic life in terms of “democratic
iterations” (pp. 176–183). Drawing on
Derrida’s notion of iteration for inspi-
ration, Benhabib sees that with every
articulation, meaning is transformed,
added on to, and enriched: there is no
original meaning to which all itera-
tions must conform (p. 179). Through
“public argument, deliberation, and
exchange” in both democratic institu-
tions (legal and political) and civil
society (the media, various associa-
tions) rights are contested, championed
and repealed. Democratic iteration
allows Benhabib to keep the political
conversation open to pluralism, see-
ing every robust democracy as embod-
ying a diversity central to the func-
tioning of that democracy (a point that
I think gets lost at times in the book,
as I discuss below).
Viewing the demos, the political
community, as separate from the eth-
nos, the collective cultural identity,
Benhabib is thus deeply suspicious of
attempts to resurrect the narrative of
national unity or a Rawlsian notion
of “the people” as a way of simplify-
ing citizenship issues (indeed she de-
votes a significant amount of space to
debunking John Rawls’s project and
other liberal positions; see Chapter 3).
Her charge is that “the people,” as it is
invoked in Rawls’s (1999) famous
work, The Law of Peoples, fails to take
into account the pluralism that inheres
in any political body. For Benhabib,
democracies are not holistic societies;
“collective identities are formed by
strands of competing and contentious
narratives” (p. 82–83). Thus “we the
people” – at least as a democratic call
for self-rule and not as a signifier for a
uniform identity – is merely always an
aspiration and in no way descriptive
of democratic societies.
[Instead,] the unity of the demos
ought to be understood not as if
it were a harmonious given, but
rather as a process of self-consti-
tution, through more or less con-
scious struggles of inclusion and
exclusion (p. 216).
In this sense, I interpret her here as
trying to move beyond the imaginary
homogeneity that has largely support-
ed national political projects, even
democratic ones. However, her criti-
cisms do not lead her to embrace a
full-blown cosmopolitanism that
would dismiss the centrality of the state
in making decisions about political
membership in favour of diffuse (and
some would say meaningless [Bauman
1999]) notions of global citizenship.
Viewing the state as central to the
flourishing of democracy which can
ensure the political participation of
individuals at a more local level, she
is firmly entrenched in the idea that
states still need to have a strong say
as to how they grant citizenship rights
to individuals within their borders.
Nonetheless she is committed to a cos-
mopolitan outlook in the sense of pro-
viding an overarching framework of
rights to which states must be held
accountable in pursuing their laws and
regulations regarding political mem-
bership. Her navigation points, then,
are positioned between the sovereignty
of the state and international human
rights, and she charts her response to
her initial questions between them,
through the idea of a cosmopolitan
federalism.
Benhabib’s version of cosmopoli-
tan federalism largely grows out of
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provide a hospitable environment to
the stranger. What his work does
emphasize, though, is that the best way
for countries to ensure peace between
themselves is to form republican con-
stitutions that adhere to the principle
of cosmopolitan right. As Benhabib
shows quite clearly, Kant articulates
for the first time a “liberal understand-
ing of sovereignty” (p. 42) whereby
the internal constitutions of states are
subject to international requirement.
This is key to Benhabib’s entire
development of cosmopolitan federal-
ism as a response to the issues of mem-
bership. The major difference with
Kant is that she rereads the sovereignty
of states as being morally bound to
extend full membership to all residents
(p. 42). To make her case she must a)
establish that membership rights are
universal rights; and b) clarify how
democracies are to go about fulfilling
this universal task without abrogating
their self-rule, what she refers to as the
“paradox of democratic legitimacy.”
Benhabib explores Hannah Arendt’s
work in order to refine her views on the
relation between membership rights and
human rights. In Origins of Totalitari-
anism, Arendt grapples with the diffi-
culties of stateless persons and draws the
conclusion that all people have the “right
to have rights.” It is worth quoting the
original from which Benhabib draws her
analysis:
We become aware of the existence
of a right to have rights … and a
right to belong to some kind of
organized community, only when
millions of people emerge who
had lost and could not regain
these rights because of the new
global political situation … the
right to have rights, or the right of
Immanuel Kant’s view of cosmopoli-
tanism as expressed in his 1795 essay,
“Perpetual peace.” Her reading of Kant
is an astute rendering of the signifi-
cance that the right for all to be granted
hospitality on foreign soil has for the
contemporary world. Kant’s third ar-
ticle for perpetual peace reads: “Cos-
mopolitan right shall be limited to con-
ditions of universal hospitality;” Kant
is careful to explicate that with respect
to hospitality we are “concerned not
with philanthropy but with right” (Kant
1795/1991, p. 105). Benhabib quite
rightly makes much of this third article
and of the fact that Kant proposes that
the right to hospitality is a right of
humanity – one that all possess by vir-
tue of being human. Kant establishes
a metaphysical justification for this
right to hospitality. But this right is a
long way off from being applied to the
question of granting full membership
to the foreigner. For Kant, the hospi-
tality afforded to the stranger as a vis-
itor does not automatically translate
into granting permanent residency:
“He [the stranger] may only claim
right of resort” (p. 106). One of the
limits, then, as Benhabib understands
it is that hospitality concerns relations
between individuals who already “be-
long to different civic entities yet who
encounter one another at the margins
of bounded communities” and does
not refer to those who occupy the same
civic entity (Benhabib 2004, p.27).
Thus the stranger is already a citizen
elsewhere. Moreover, Kant claims that
it is only through the beneficence of
the state that full rights of belonging
are to be granted to the stranger. In
other words the state is neither legally
nor morally bound to confer such be-
longing – it is only morally bound to
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every individual to belong to hu-
manity, should be guaranteed by
humanity itself. It is by no means
certain whether this is possible.
(quoted in Benhabib 2004, p. 55)
Benhabib’s gloss on the phrase, “the
right to have rights,” is particularly
incisive in laying bare the two differ-
ent aspects of rights implied here. Ben-
habib reads the first use of the term right
as “a moral claim to membership and
a certain form of treatment compatible
with the claim to membership” (p. 56).
The second use refers to the rights al-
ready possessed by a member of a po-
litical community. Although the moral
claim to be recognized as a rights-
bearing person is universal (that is, it
transcends all borders), Benhabib points
out that in Arendt’s case this was not
due to some metaphysical properties of
humanity (contra Kant). Arendt instead
offers a political solution to recogni-
tion: it is only through political com-
munity where the right to have rights
might be realized (p. 59). Indeed, in the
last sentence of the quote above, Arendt
doubts that humanity itself can secure
the recognition required to be entitled
to rights. At the end of the day, Ben-
habib sees Arendt’s reliance upon polit-
ical community as just as dissatisfying
as Kant’s failure to extend hospitality
to include full membership, for it relies
on the “historical arbitrariness of re-
publican acts of founding whose ark of
equality will always include some and
exclude others” (p. 66).
While her reading of both Kant and
Arendt critically appropriates the key
terms of “right of humanity” and the
“right to have rights,” Benhabib attempts
a “postmetaphysical justification of the
principle of right” (esp. pp. 131–134) in
order to circumvent the problems she
sees in their positions. In putting forth a
cosmopolitan federalism, she is attempt-
ing to secure a moral reason for states
to confer full membership to those who
reside within their borders, without sac-
rificing the democratic ability of a po-
litical community to define for itself
what it thinks best. The rights of others
in this view must always occur within
the paradox of democratic legitimacy –
that is, the irresolvable conflict that
arises when the sovereign of democ-
racy (“we, the people”) is legitimated
by an act of constitution that itself con-
forms to universal human rights. Her
attempt to universalize membership
rights lies in her proposal of a discur-
sive ethical position:
I can justify to you with good
grounds that you and I should re-
spect each others’ reciprocal claims
to act in certain ways and not to
act in others, and to enjoy certain
resources and services (p. 130).
Here is where the universality of respect
appears alongside egalitarian reciproc-
ity as the metanorms that guide discur-
sive practice in democracies (p. 13).
What she reveals here, though, is an
unjustified appeal to these universal
norms via discourse ethics that then
serves as the justification for her claim
that membership rights are universal.
This position, however, fails to appre-
ciate fully and bring to logical con-
clusion her otherwise compelling ar-
gument in favour of the rights of oth-
ers and the notion of democratic iter-
ation that, in my view, better support
her cosmopolitan federalism.
Admitting that objections have
been raised with respect to the petitio
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democratic iterations. This seems to
me inadequate for addressing the
complexity of membership issues, es-
pecially when all norms get subsumed
under discourse ethics:
norms whose origins may lie out-
side discursive processes ought to
be discursively justifiable, when and
if called into question (p. 133).
The moral universalism she is bound
to through her version of Haberma-
sian discourse ethics (e.g., with respect
to reciprocity) reduces communication
with the other to a rational mode of
justification to which both parties must
subject themselves. In my view, the
danger she faces is that if we place
too much emphasis on moral univer-
salism both for human rights and in
terms of the communicative grounds
of democracy, there is a diminishment
of the political in terms of the inevita-
ble struggle over how to make abstract
principles meaningful in specific civic
contexts (whether we are speaking of
how membership rights are made
meaningful, or of the very meaning of
respect and egalitarian reciprocity that
inform communication for Benhabib).
But, even more importantly in my
view, there is a diminishment in un-
derstanding what communication with
the other entails – particularly those
others, such as refugees and asylees,
who have limited room to speak – and
to be listened to.
Not that rules for communication
are systematically unimportant, but it
seems to me that not only does politi-
cal discourse suffer if it becomes pro-
grammatic, it also fails to consider that
communication with another human
being is not simply procedural, nor can
principii of discourse ethics, she none-
theless defends her position in terms of
the right to justification.
Your freedom can be restricted
only through reciprocally and
generally justifiable norms which
equally apply to all (p. 133).
So now what we have is a translation
of human right into discursive right.
The postmetaphysical justification of
rights discourse turns out to be the
right to justification itself. My prob-
lem with this is not only the circularity
of the argument – one has to accept
the justificatory universal metanorms
of respect and egalitarian reciprocity
without justification; the principle of
right is thereby turned into an unjusti-
fiable principle of justification – but
has to do with the fact that I think the
other has been forgotten in her appeal
to freedom as a reciprocal grounding
of rights, and as a result the specifi-
cally political aspect of her work is
undermined. That is, while she asks
the right – and demanding – questions
of political belonging, and insists that
the “others” who are the products of
liberal democratic political boundaries
need to be heard and attain some
measure of democratic participation,
she fails fully to radicalize this idea.
By not pushing the envelope further,
she takes much of the political edge
off the struggles over belonging. I do
not buy the argument – particularly
as it is here used as a justification –
that convincing the other of “the va-
lidity of norms” with good reasons
constitutes the basis for a vibrant po-
litical discussion, particularly when it
is precisely these norms that are polit-
icized – that is, concretized through
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it always be about reciprocity and
mutuality. My relation to another’s
discourse is necessarily asymmetrical
because it is the other who speaks;
what she says can never totally cap-
ture her otherness, and neither can my
understanding of her speech. Engag-
ing in discourse, then, is a response
not only to the words she speaks (the
said) but to the difference she reveals
(the saying). It is here that Emmanuel
Levinas, for instance, has located the
emergence of responsibility as a re-
sponse to the other. Thus, even in our
striving for understanding and mutu-
ality we risk undermining the very
difference that makes dialogue inevi-
table in the first place. As Robert Gibbs
(2000) has commented on his own
reading of Levinasian responsibility to
the other in relation to Habermasian
discourse ethics:
Were the sequence of our presenta-
tion to become a simple narrative,
that is, first we must respond, and
then subsequently we learn to con-
verse, to take turns and exchange
interpretations, reasoning toward
a consensus; then we would mis-
understand the ways signs work.
All use of signs involves both func-
tions, both asymmetrical respon-
sibility and a goal of mutuality that
can never leave behind the asym-
metry (p. 146).
What I would like to suggest is that
returning to the other as the fulcrum
for Benhabib’s argument on the com-
municative aspects of democracy
would radicalize the potential for dem-
ocratic practices to take alternative
forms, ones that would truly take issue
with the impossible task of seeking
universal rules of justification as the
only desirable means for our ability
to listen to others. Indeed, Iris Marion
Young (2000), drawing on Levinas, has
proposed that the moment of greeting
is a moment of public acknowledge-
ment, where response to the speaker
is much less about rules and more
about the recognition of difference (pp.
57–59). How might, then, communi-
cation itself be understood in terms of
its plurality? It seems to me that this
would require resisting the tendency of
discourse ethics to subsume participants
into regimes of universalism that al-
ready delineate the ground of meaning;
it also invites us to see discourse as it-
self a revelation of difference through
which meaning is created and re-created
– which is, after all, a key element in a
robust political sphere. I think Benhab-
ib actually contributes to this radicali-
ty through her notion of democratic it-
eration (which indeed is very much
about difference), but seems to back off
from its full implications. Through it-
eration, we can see the other as partici-
pating in various discursive strategies,
all of which do not fall under the re-
gime of universalism embodied in dis-
course ethics. Indeed, I think if we heed
Derrida’s (2002) call for politics to
work the contradictory spaces of hos-
pitality, democratic iteration is crucial,
for it compels us to examine the impli-
cations of our iterations in relation to
what meaning – and value – we are
granting to rights; and what meaning
and value we are granting to the other
to have such rights. In fact, I see this as
Benhabib’s main challenge. And in
terms of education specifically, her fo-
cus on both democratic iteration and
the other as central to cosmopolitan
federalism leads to a number of ques-
tions that I think capture the global di-
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